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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
SAN JOSE DIVISION 
 
WINSTON SMITH, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
 
FACEBOOK, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
 
Case No. 5:16-cv-01282-EJD   
 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Re: Dkt. No. 96 
 
 
Plaintiffs allege that the Healthcare Defendants
1
 disclosed information about Plaintiffs’ 
web browsing activity to Defendant Facebook, Inc. Defendants move to dismiss under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6). Defendants’ motion will be GRANTED because this 
Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Healthcare Defendants and because Plaintiffs consented 
to Facebook’s conduct. 
                                                 
1
 The “Healthcare Defendants” are seven hospitals and healthcare organizations: American Cancer 
Society, Inc.; American Society of Clinical Oncology, Inc.; Melanoma Research Foundation; 
Adventist Health System Sunbelt Healthcare Corporation; BJC Health System d/b/a BJC 
HealthCare; Cleveland Clinic of Texas; and University of Texas—MD Anderson Cancer Center. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Parties 
The Healthcare Defendants operate websites that publish information about medical 
conditions and treatments. Compl. ¶¶ 2–3, 107–206, Dkt. No. 1. For instance, visitors to 
http://www.cancer.net/ (operated by Defendant American Society of Clinical Oncology) can read 
articles on topics like cancer treatment, types of cancer, and recent research in the field. 
Facebook is a “free social networking service that allows people to connect and share 
content.” Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“MTD”) 1, Dkt. No. 96. It makes money by letting third parties 
show ads to its users. Id. To improve ad targeting, it “collects information about people’s 
browsing activities, mainly on Facebook but also on third-party websites that host Facebook tools 
and features.” Id. 
Plaintiffs are registered Facebook users who visited the Healthcare Defendants’ websites. 
Compl. ¶¶ 2, 6–8. 
B. How Visitors Communicate with the Healthcare Defendants’ Websites 
To access one of the Healthcare Defendants’ websites, a visitor might type 
www.cancer.net into the address bar of her web browser and click the “Go” button. The browser 
then sends a message called a “GET request”2 to the web server associated with that address. The 
GET request specifies the page that the visitor wants to retrieve, like “the home page of the 
website located at cancer.net.” It also provides information about the visitor, like her language, 
operating system, browser settings, and other technical parameters. 
The web server responds with code that tells the visitor’s browser how the page should 
appear. For example, the code might instruct the browser to display the phrase “timely, 
comprehensive, oncologist-approved information” as italic white text on a blue background. It 
might also contain links, images, videos, and other content. 
                                                 
2
 The mechanics of GET requests are described at Compl. ¶¶ 21–52 and MTD 3–5; see also R. 
Fielding et al., RFC 2068: Hypertext Transfer Protocol—HTTP/1.1, Internet Engineering Task 
Force (Jan. 1997), https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2068.txt [https://perma.cc/2X3E-SYQV/]. 
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The user might click a link to visit another page. That click triggers a second GET request 
that is similar to the first, but it requests a page at a new URL—for instance, it might ask for 
http://www.cancer.net/cancer-types/ instead of http://www.cancer.net/. The second request 
includes a “referer header” that contains the address of the first page.  
C. How Facebook Tracks Visitors’ Web Browsing Activity 
Website owners can add Facebook functionality to their sites using tools that Facebook 
provides. Id. ¶¶ 78, 84; see also Social Plugins, Facebook for Developers, 
https://developers.facebook.com/docs/plugins/ [https://perma.cc/NL8B-859K/] (last visited April 
25, 2017). For example, sites can add “Like” or “Share” buttons that let visitors share content on 
Facebook. Someone reading an article about cancer treatment could click a “Share” button to post 
the article to Facebook. 
To display a Facebook button, a website owner embeds a code snippet that Facebook 
provides. When someone visits a page where a Facebook button is embedded, the visitor’s 
browser makes two GET requests. First, it makes an ordinary request to load the page, as 
explained above. Second, the Facebook code snippet triggers a background request to Facebook’s 
servers. The Facebook server responds with code that makes the button appear on the page. The 
communication with Facebook happens silently; a savvy user could use tools to watch her browser 
exchange information behind the scenes, but the connection to Facebook’s servers is invisible by 
default. The request to Facebook includes a referer header containing the address of the page 
where the Facebook button is embedded. So, when someone reads a page on cancer.net that 
contains a Facebook “Like” button, Facebook knows which page that person visited. 
Facebook uses these background requests to uniquely identify people. It uses at least three 
identification techniques. First, a visitor will likely have a unique IP address
3
 that stays the same 
as she visits multiple pages. The IP address is included in each GET request, which enables 
Facebook to keep track of the page visits associated with that address. Id. ¶¶ 27–29, 85, 102. 
                                                 
3
 However, IP addresses can be shared among several users. For instance, users on the same Wi-Fi 
network will have the same public IP address. 
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Second, Facebook puts cookies on visitors’ computers. It uses these cookies to store information 
about each visitor—for instance, the “c_user” cookie is a unique identifier, and the “lu” cookie 
identifies the last Facebook user who logged in using that browser. Id. ¶¶ 40–52, 82–85, 120. Like 
IP addresses, cookies are included with each request that the visitor’s browser makes to 
Facebook’s servers. Third, Facebook uses browser fingerprinting. Web browsers have several 
attributes that vary between users, like the browser software version, plugins that have been 
installed, fonts that are available on the system, the size of the screen, color depth, and more. 
Together, these attributes create a fingerprint that is highly distinctive. The likelihood that two 
browsers have the same fingerprint is at least as low as 1 in 286,777—and the accuracy of the 
fingerprint increases when combined with cookies and the user’s IP address. Id. ¶¶ 96, 97. 
Facebook recognizes a visitor’s browser fingerprint each time a Facebook button is loaded on a 
third-party page. 
Using these techniques, Facebook can identify individual users and watch as they browse 
third-party websites like cancer.net. 
D. Plaintiffs’ Allegations 
Plaintiffs allege that Facebook used the techniques described above to uniquely identify 
Plaintiffs (and class members) and track the pages they visited on the Healthcare Defendants’ 
websites. Id. ¶¶ 85, 97, 102. Based on this conduct, they bring causes of action against Facebook 
and the Healthcare Defendants for violations of the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (id. ¶¶ 249–
94), the California Invasion of Privacy Act, Cal. Penal Code §§ 631(a), 632 (id. ¶¶ 305–21), and 
privacy protections under the California Constitution (id. ¶¶ 322–31), as well as common-law tort 
claims for intrusion upon seclusion (id. ¶¶ 295–304) and negligence per se (id. ¶¶ 332–37). They 
also bring causes of action against Facebook (but not the Healthcare Defendants) for breach of the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing (id. ¶¶ 348–62), fraud (id. ¶¶ 363–68), and quantum meruit (id. 
¶¶ 396–72). Finally, they bring causes of action against the Healthcare Defendants (but not 
Facebook) for negligent disclosure of confidential information (id. ¶¶ 338–42) and breach of the 
fiduciary duty of confidentiality (id. ¶¶ 343–47). 
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II. LEGAL STANDARDS 
A. Rule 12(b)(1) 
Dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) is appropriate if the complaint fails to allege facts 
sufficient to establish subject-matter jurisdiction. Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 
1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court “is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may 
review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the 
existence of jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). The 
nonmoving party bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010). 
B. Rule 12(b)(2) 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) allows dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. When the 
motion to dismiss is a defendant’s first response to the complaint, the plaintiff need only make a 
prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists. See Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., 
Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977). While a plaintiff cannot “ ‘simply rest on the bare 
allegations of its complaint,’ uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as true” 
and “[c]onflicts between parties over statements contained in affidavits must be resolved in the 
plaintiff’s favor.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Amba Marketing Sys., Inc. v. Jobar Int’l, Inc., 551 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1977), and 
citing AT&T v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
C. Rule 12(b)(6) 
A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of claims 
alleged in the complaint. Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 
1995). Dismissal “is proper only where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of 
sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 
(9th Cir. 2001). The complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
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III. DISCUSSION 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed because (among other 
reasons) this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Healthcare Defendants and because 
Plaintiffs consented to Facebook’s conduct. The Court agrees. 
A. This Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Healthcare Defendants. 
Neither Plaintiffs nor the Healthcare Defendants are California residents (Compl. ¶¶ 6–9, 
10–16), but Plaintiffs contend that the Healthcare Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in 
California because they participate in sending Plaintiffs’ data to Facebook. Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ 
Mot. to Dismiss (“Opp’n”) 12, Dkt. No. 105 (arguing that the Healthcare Defendants 
“continuously and systematically send users’ sensitive medical information to Facebook, which is 
headquartered in California, each and every time a user sends a GET request to the health care 
Defendants’ respective websites”). 
When no applicable federal statute authorizes personal jurisdiction, a district court applies 
the law of the state where the court sits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A); Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. 
Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998). California’s long-arm statute has the same due 
process requirements as the federal long-arm statute. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 801. Under the 
Due Process Clause, nonresident defendants must have “minimum contacts” with the forum state 
such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Where a defendant moves 
to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of 
demonstrating that jurisdiction is appropriate. Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 
1990).  
i. Specific Personal Jurisdiction 
Specific personal jurisdiction exists when (1) the non-resident defendant purposefully 
directs activities to the forum or purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities 
in the forum; (2) the claim arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and 
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. “If any of the three 
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requirements is not satisfied, jurisdiction in the forum would deprive the defendant of due process 
of law.” Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri Al S, 52 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1995). The 
plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. 
Purposeful availment and purposeful direction are distinct concepts. Id. “A showing that a 
defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of doing business in a forum state typically 
consists of evidence of the defendant’s actions in the forum, such as executing or performing a 
contract there.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). In 
return for availing itself of the benefits and protections of the forum state’s laws, the defendant 
must “submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 
U.S. 462, 476 (1985). 
By contrast, a “showing that a defendant purposefully directed his conduct toward a forum 
state . . . usually consists of evidence of the defendant’s actions outside the forum state that are 
directed at the forum, such as the distribution in the forum state of goods originating elsewhere.” 
Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803 (emphasis added). Due process allows “the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant who ‘purposefully direct[s]’ his activities at residents of a forum, 
even in the ‘absence of physical contacts’ with the forum.” Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 
476). 
Nothing in Plaintiffs’ allegations suggests that the Healthcare Defendants purposefully 
availed themselves of the benefits of doing business in California. Rather, Plaintiffs allege that the 
Healthcare Defendants “purposefully directed their activity to California” by “send[ing] users’ 
sensitive medical communications to Facebook every time a user sends a GET request to the 
health care Defendants’ respective websites.” Opp’n 12. 
To evaluate purposeful direction, courts in the Ninth Circuit apply the three-part test from 
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (applying the Calder test). To satisfy the Calder test, the defendant “must have (1) 
committed an intentional act, which was (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, and (3) caused 
harm, the brunt of which is suffered and which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the 
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forum state.” Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1156.  
Plaintiffs have satisfied the first prong (“an intentional act”). The Healthcare Defendants 
acted intentionally when they embedded Facebook code on their websites. 
Under the second prong (“expressly aimed at the forum state”), Plaintiffs’ theory is that the 
Healthcare Defendants expressly aimed their conduct at California by “continuously and 
systematically send[ing] users’ sensitive medical communications to Facebook . . . .” Opp’n 12. 
Facebook’s tracking is indeed continuous and systematic. Every time someone views a 
page containing a Facebook button on one of the Healthcare Defendants’ sites (or elsewhere on 
the internet), Facebook logs that visit and correlates it with the visitor’s other activity. Systematic 
tracking is the point: Facebook improves its ad targeting, and makes more money, by gathering 
comprehensive information about its users’ browsing habits. 
But the comprehensiveness of Facebook’s tracking does not establish that the Healthcare 
Defendants “send” information to Facebook, as Plaintiffs suggest. More accurately, they embed 
code that creates a new connection between a visitor’s browser and a Facebook server. The 
website’s decision to embed the code allows that connection to occur, but the connection happens 
independently. Besides triggering a second GET request in the user’s browser, the Healthcare 
Defendants play no part in the exchange of data between Facebook and Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs also admit that they do not know whether the Healthcare Defendants were aware 
that Facebook used embedded buttons to track their visitors. Compl. ¶ 105. Personal jurisdiction 
cannot be based on the possibility that the Healthcare Defendants’ acts could have foreseeable 
effects in California. See Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (holding that Calder “cannot stand for the broad proposition that a foreign act with 
foreseeable effects in the forum state always gives rise to specific jurisdiction”). Personal 
jurisdiction requires “something more”—namely, “wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom 
the defendant knows to be a resident of the forum state.” Id. The Healthcare Defendants cannot 
have “targeted” activity at known California residents if they were unaware that the activity was 
happening. 
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But even if the Healthcare Defendants knew that Facebook tracks users via “Share” and 
“Like” buttons, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not support the conclusion that the Healthcare 
Defendants targeted their activities at Plaintiffs in California. Without “something more,” 
embedding third-party code cannot confer personal jurisdiction over a website operator in the 
forum where the third party resides. Embedded third-party code is ubiquitous, not just in the form 
of Facebook buttons, but also in the form of videos, ads, analytics services, code libraries, content 
delivery networks, and myriad other tools. Under Plaintiffs’ theory, every website operator that 
embeds one of these tools could be haled into court where the third-party company resides. 
Personal jurisdiction cannot reasonably stretch so far. This Court is aware of no other case that 
raises the same question, but courts have reached the same conclusion in related scenarios. See, 
e.g., NuboNau, Inc. v. NB Labs, Ltd, No. 10-cv-2631-LAB (BGS), 2012 WL 843503, at *6 (S.D. 
Cal. Mar. 9, 2012) (“the Court doesn’t find that merely engaging Twitter and Facebook to promote 
one’s business constitutes purposeful direction at California, simply because Twitter and 
Facebook happen to be based there”); DFSB Collective Co. Ltd. v. Bourne, 897 F. Supp. 2d. 871, 
884 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that the defendant did not purposefully direct activities at California 
by “utiliz[ing] accounts on California-headquartered Internet companies Facebook, hi5.com, 
DeviantArt, and 4Shared to direct traffic to his Websites”); see also CollegeSource, Inc. v. 
AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2011) (“If the maintenance of an interactive 
website were sufficient to support general jurisdiction in every forum in which users interacted 
with the website, the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts 
would be the inevitable result.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Because they did not purposefully direct activities to California or purposefully avail 
themselves of the privilege of conducting business in California (Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 
802), this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Healthcare Defendants.  
ii. General Personal Jurisdiction 
General personal jurisdiction exists when a corporation’s “affiliations with the State are so 
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” Daimler AG 
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v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014). Plaintiffs argue that general personal jurisdiction arises 
from the fact that the Healthcare Defendants “continuously and systematically send users’ 
sensitive medical communications to Facebook”—that is, from the same activity that Plaintiffs 
believe creates specific personal jurisdiction. Opp’n 12. Since that activity is insufficient to 
establish specific personal jurisdiction, it falls well short of establishing that the Healthcare 
Defendants are “essentially at home” in California. See Teras Cargo Transp. (Am.), LLC v. Cal 
Dive Int’l (Australia) Pty Ltd., No. 15-CV-03566-JSC, 2015 WL 6089276, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 
16, 2015) (“the threshold level of contacts required for general jurisdiction is even higher than is 
required for specific jurisdiction”). 
iii. Forum Selection Clause 
 Plaintiffs argue that “Facebook users, including web developers and operators like the 
health care Defendants, submit to this Court’s personal jurisdiction for the purpose of all claims 
related to Facebook.” Opp’n 13. Their argument is based on the forum selection clause in 
Facebook’s Terms of Service: 
 
You will resolve any claim, cause of action or dispute (claim) you 
have with us arising out of or relating to this Statement or Facebook 
exclusively in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California or a state court located in San Mateo County, and you 
agree to submit to the personal jurisdiction of such courts for the 
purpose of litigating all such claims. 
 
Compl. Ex. A at 3. 
This clause applies only to disputes between the Healthcare Defendants and Facebook. See 
id. (stating that the forum shall be the Northern District of California for “any claim, cause of 
action or dispute . . . you have with us”) (emphasis added). It does not create personal jurisdiction 
in California over the Healthcare Defendants when they are sued by third parties, even if Facebook 
is also a defendant. 
B. Plaintiffs consented to Facebook’s tracking activity. 
Plaintiffs agreed to several Facebook policies when they signed up for accounts 
(Compl. ¶¶ 58–78), including Facebook’s Data Policy: 
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We collect information when you visit or use third-party websites 
and apps that use our Services (like when they offer our Like button 
or Facebook Log In or use our measurement and advertising 
services). This includes information about the websites and apps you 
visit, your use of our Services on those websites and apps, as well as 
information the developer or publisher of the app or website 
provides to you or us. 
Compl. Ex. A at 2. Facebook’s Cookie Policy also contains several broad disclosures, including 
information about how Facebook tracks users to improve its ad targeting: 
 
Cookies are small files that are placed on your browser or device by 
the website or app you’re using or ad you’re viewing. Pixel tags 
(also called clear GIFs, web beacons, or pixels) are small blocks of 
code on a webpage or app that allow them to do things like read and 
place cookies and transmit information to us or our partners. The 
resulting connection can include information such as a device’s IP 
address, the time a person viewed the pixel, an identifier associated 
with the browser or device and the type of browser being used. 
 
. . .  
 
Things like Cookies and similar technologies (such as information 
about your device or a pixel on a website) are used to understand 
and deliver ads, make them more relevant to you, and analyze 
products and services and the use of those products and services. 
 
For example, we use cookies so we, or our affiliates and partners, 
can serve you ads that may be interesting to you on Facebook 
Services or other websites and mobile applications. 
Compl. Ex. C at 1–2. 
Plaintiffs give several reasons why they believe these policies do not adequately disclose 
that Facebook collects information about its users when they visit third-party websites. First, 
Plaintiffs argue that Facebook’s disclosure is “buried in a Terms of Service or Privacy Policy that 
may never be viewed.” Opp’n 19 (quoting Perkins v. LinkedIn Corp., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1212 
(N.D. Cal. 2014)). But Plaintiffs acknowledge in their complaint that the Facebook policies, 
including the Data Policy and the Cookie Policy, “constitute[] a valid contract.” Compl. ¶ 59. 
Also, in their cause of action against Facebook for fraud, Plaintiffs allege that they relied on 
Facebook’s assertions in the very same contracts. Compl. ¶¶ 366–67 (“Facebook violated § 1572, 
actual fraud, through its suppression, with the intent to deceive its users, of the facts that it . . . 
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tracks and intercepts user communications with health-care related websites. . . . Plaintiffs relied 
on Facebook’s false assertions in contracting with and using Facebook.”). Having alleged that they 
understood and agreed to Facebook’s policies, Plaintiffs cannot now claim to be ignorant of their 
contents. 
Plaintiffs also argue that Facebook’s policies are too “vague” and “broad” to be 
enforceable. Opp’n 19–20. Yet Facebook’s Data Policy discloses the precise conduct at issue in 
this case: “We collect information when you visit or use third-party websites and apps that use our 
Services (like when they offer our Like button . . . ).” Compl. Ex. A at 2 (emphasis added). The 
meaning of “information” might be broad—it could include any data transmitted when the 
visitor’s browser connects to Facebook’s servers, including cookies, referer headers, and all the 
parts that combine to form a browser fingerprint. But, as Defendants point out, “a contractual term 
is not ambiguous just because it is broad.” F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 
958, 964 (9th Cir. 2010); see MTD 17. Several courts have held that similar disclosures constitute 
adequate notice of tracking activity. See, e.g., Mortensen v. Bresnan Commc’n, L.L.C., No. CV 
10-13-BLG-RFC, 2010 WL 5140454, at *5 (D. Mont. Dec. 13, 2010) (holding that customers 
agreed to allow their internet service provider to send all of their network traffic to a third party, 
because the provider disclosed that customers’ “electronic transmissions would be monitored and 
would in fact be transferred to third-parties for the purposes of providing ‘content or services’ ”); 
Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C11-366RSL, 2012 WL 1997697, at *6 (W.D. Wash. June 
1, 2012) (holding that the defendant “notif[ied] visitors that it will take the very actions about 
which Plaintiffs now complain: place browser and Flash cookies on their computers and use those 
cookies to monitor and collect information about their navigation and shopping habits”); Perkins, 
53 F. Supp. 3d at 1214 (holding that LinkedIn adequately disclosed that it collected email 
addresses from users’ contact lists when they created accounts, because it told users that 
“LinkedIn.com is asking for some information from your Google Account,” including the users’ 
“Google Contacts”). 
Plaintiffs suggest that because “sensitive medical information” is involved, Facebook must 
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meet a stricter disclosure standard under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(“HIPAA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1320d-8 (and under similar state-law provisions in Cal. Civ. 
Code § 1798.91). Opp’n 14–17. Under HIPAA, “protected health information” is defined as 
“individually identifiable” information that is “created or received by a health care provider” (or 
similar entities) that “[r]elates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition 
of an individual.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. To disclose protected health information about a person, a 
the disclosing party must obtain the person’s signed, written consent (among other requirements). 
45 C.F.R. § 164.508. According to Plaintiffs, the disclosures in Facebook’s policies do not meet 
HIPAA’s heightened authorization requirements.  
Plaintiffs’ argument fails because Facebook did not collect “protected health information.” 
As discussed above, requests to Facebook’s servers can include several types of information about 
the user, including browser settings, language, operating system, IP address, and the contents of 
cookies that Facebook has set. But that same information is transmitted to Facebook every time a 
user visits any page on the internet that contains a Facebook button. Nothing about that 
information relates specifically to Plaintiffs’ health. The only difference between those requests is 
the referer header, which contains the URL of the page where the Facebook button is embedded. 
The URLs at issue in this case point to pages containing information about treatment options for 
melanoma,
4
 information about a specific doctor,
5
 search results related to the phrase “intestine 
transplant,”6 a wife’s blog post about her husband’s cancer diagnosis,7 and other publicly available 
medical information. See MTD Ex. A (compiling a list of the URLs that Plaintiffs allege were 
disclosed to Facebook). These pages contain general health information that is accessible to the 
public at large. The same pages are available to every computer, tablet, smartphone, or automated 
crawler that sends GET requests to these URLs. Nothing about the URLs, or the content of the 
                                                 
4
 http://www.cancer.net/cancer-types/melanoma/treatment-options (Compl. ¶ 132). 
5
 http://www.shawneemission.org/find-adoctor?doctor=Scott-E-Ashcraft-MD-1407822869#.U77 
dgKhRa-k (Compl. ¶ 161). 
6
 http://my.clevelandclinic.org/search/results?q=intestine%20transplant (Compl. ¶ 188). 
7
 https://www.mdanderson.org/publications/cancerwise/2012/06/ metastatic-melanoma-a-wife-
reflects-on-husbands-shocking-diagnos.html (Compl. ¶ 202). 
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pages located at those URLs,
8
 relates “to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or 
condition of an individual.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (emphasis added). As such, the stricter 
authorization requirements of HIPAA (as well as Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.91) do not apply. 
Plaintiffs’ consent bars their statutory causes of action against Facebook. Plaintiffs’ claim 
under the Wiretap Act fails because “consent of one of the parties to the communication [is] 
sufficient to preclude liability under the Wiretap Act.” Backhaut v. Apple, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 
1033, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2014); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (stating that no liability exists where 
“one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent” to interception). Similarly, 
Plaintiffs cannot state a claim under the California Invasion of Privacy Act because that statute 
imposes liability only for interception “without the consent of all parties.” Cal. Penal Code 
§§ 631(a), 632; see also Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that a communication is confidential under § 632 only when a party “has an objectively 
reasonable expectation that the conversation is not being overheard or recorded”) (quoting 
Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 39 Cal. 4th 95, 117 n.7 (2006)). 
Plaintiffs’ consent also bars their common-law tort claims and their claim for invasion of 
privacy under the California Constitution. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3515 (“He who consents to an act 
is not wronged by it.”); Kent v. Microsoft Corp., No. SACV13-0091 DOC ANX, 2013 WL 
3353875, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 1, 2013) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss because 
“plaintiffs generally may not assert a wrong arising out of an action which they consented to”); 
Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 26 (1994) (“[T]he plaintiff in an invasion of 
privacy case must have conducted himself or herself in a manner consistent with an actual 
expectation of privacy, i.e., he or she must not have manifested by his or her conduct a voluntary 
consent to the invasive actions of defendant. If voluntary consent is present, a defendant’s conduct 
                                                 
8
 Plaintiffs note that Facebook “knows the contents of communications between users and 
websites” because, every 30 days, it scrapes the contents of pages containing Facebook buttons. 
Compl. ¶ 86. This allegation only highlights the fact that the Healthcare Defendants’ websites do 
not contain individualized health care information: Facebook’s scraper only collects publicly 
available information on the Healthcare Defendant’s websites, regardless of whether Plaintiffs (or 
others) visited those sites. 
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will rarely be deemed ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person’ so as to justify tort liability.”); In 
re Yahoo Mail Litig., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1037–38 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that a plaintiff 
asserting a privacy claim under the California Constitution “must have conducted himself or 
herself in a manner consistent with an actual expectation of privacy, i.e., he or she must not have 
manifested by his or her conduct a voluntary consent to the invasive actions of defendant,” and 
granting defendant’s motion to dismiss). 
IV. LEAVE TO AMEND 
Courts “should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
15(a)(2); In re Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 642 F.3d 685, 701 (9th Cir. 2011). Absent a showing of 
prejudice, delay, bad faith, or futility, there is a strong presumption in favor of granting leave to 
amend. Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). However, 
courts can dismiss without leave to amend if “allegation of other facts consistent with the 
challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 
761 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Albrecht v. Lund, 845 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also  
Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725–26 (9th Cir. 2000) (“a district court acts within 
its discretion to deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile”). 
In this case, no consistent amendment could support a finding of personal jurisdiction over 
the Healthcare Defendants. Both the Plaintiffs and the Healthcare Defendants reside in other 
states. Plaintiffs’ theory of personal jurisdiction is that the Healthcare Defendants embedded 
Facebook tools on their websites, which allowed some of Plaintiffs’ browsing data to be sent to 
Facebook. This activity is insufficient as a matter of law to confer jurisdiction over the Healthcare 
Defendants in California. No further allegations consistent with the original complaint could 
change this conclusion. 
Likewise, no amendment could change the fact that Plaintiffs consented to Facebook’s 
conduct. Facebook’s policies disclose the precise activity at issue in this case. See, e.g., Compl. 
Ex. A at 2 (“We collect information when you visit or use third-party websites and apps that use 
our Services (like when they offer our Like button or Facebook Log In or use our measurement 
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and advertising services).”); id. Ex. C at 1–2 (disclosing that Facebook uses a variety of 
techniques to track users on third-party sites, and explaining that the “resulting connection [to 
Facebook’s servers] can include information such as a device’s IP address, the time a person 
viewed the [site], an identifier associated with the browser or device and the type of browser being 
used”). Plaintiffs admit that they understood and agreed to Facebook’s policies. No further 
allegations could allow Plaintiffs to bring claims “arising out of conduct which they consented to.” 
Kent, 2013 WL 3353875, at *6. 
Because amendment would be futile, the Court will dismiss the complaint without leave to 
amend. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Healthcare Defendants because Plaintiffs 
have not established that the Healthcare Defendants have minimum contacts with California. 
Plaintiffs’ claims against Facebook fail because Plaintiffs consented to Facebook’s conduct. As 
such, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed without 
leave to amend. The Clerk shall close this file. 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: May 9, 2017 
______________________________________ 
EDWARD J. DAVILA 
United States District Judge 
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